High Court Rules in Favour of Former Relevant Child

Rahul Kanani

‘Significant Unfairness’ and ‘Unlawfulness’: High Court Takes Exceptional Step of Directing Local Authority to Exercise Discretion to Treat Claimant as a Former Relevant Child

On 6 August 2025, the Administrative Court handed down judgment in the case of LB v London Borough of Enfield [2025] AC-2025-LON-000186, in favour of the Claimant (LB) against the Defendant Local Authority (London Borough of Enfield).

The case concerned a Judicial Review challenge in relation to whether the Defendant Local Authority acted unlawfully in refusing to consider whether to exercise its discretion and treat the Claimant ‘as if’ he was a former relevant child and provide him with leaving care support under the Children Act 1989.

The Background

LB arrived in the United Kingdom (UK) on or around 31 October 2023 and claimed asylum and international protection. Upon arrival in the UK, LB was assessed by the Home Office. Despite providing the Home Office officers with his age and date of birth (14 October 2006), he was ascribed a date of birth of 14 October 2000 following a visual assessment by two Home Office members of staff. As a result of the Home Office decision, LB was not referred to a Local Authority’s Children’s Service for assessment and support. Instead, he was placed in an adult asylum accommodation where he resided for around five nights, before arrangements were made for him to stay at different family members houses.

On 26 March 2024, LB first came to the attention of the London Borough of Enfield (Enfield) following a referral from LB’s immigration solicitors. LB’s immigration solicitors requested Enfield to carry out an age assessment as LB disputed the age provided by the Home Office and had documentary evidence to support his claimed age and date of birth.

On 10 April 2024, Enfield responded to LB’s immigration solicitors and confirmed that they were not able to assist with an age assessment as LB was ‘not a looked after child to Enfield, nor are any services being requested […]’.

On 29 July 2024, Enfield received an urgent safeguarding referral from Refugee Council for LB to be assessed under the provisions of the Children Act 1989 and the Working Together to Safeguard Children statutory guidance 2018. The referral was made due to concerns about LB’s wellbeing, with a request for Enfield to accommodate and support LB in accordance with his claimed age. On 31 July 2024, LB was accommodated under Section 20 Children Act 1989.

On 16 August 2024, following being instructed by LB to assist with his age dispute matter, initial correspondence was sent to Enfield, requesting clarification on their position in relation to the age and date of birth of LB.

On 19 August 2024, Enfield confirmed to LB’s legal representatives that they had accepted LB’s claimed age and date of birth (14 October 2006), and so at the time he first came to their attention, he was in fact a child.

Enfield also confirmed to LB’s legal representatives that they would not be providing LB with support after his 18^th birthday as he would only have been in their care for 10 weeks (falling short of the requisite 13 weeks). Osbornes Law were instructed to seek to resolve this issue for LB and to ensure LB would be treated as a former relevant child.

We wrote to Enfield requesting that it exercise its discretion to treat LB as a former relevant child given his vulnerabilities and that he fell only 3 weeks short of the required 13 weeks. We contended that Enfield acted unlawfully in their failure to act appropriately when they received a referral on 26 March 2024, and had further enquiries been undertaken, we submitted that LB would have been considered a child ‘in need’, and so the 13 weeks should run from that date (as opposed to in July 2024).

We engaged in extensive pre-action correspondence and in total, sent two detailed letters and two letter before claims to the Defendant to consider.

On 10 January 2025, following negative responses, we issued a Judicial Review claim. In granting permission, the Court expedited the claim, and a substantive hearing took place on 20 May 2025, and a substantive hearing took place on 20 May 2025.

Key Submissions

Claimant

We argued that when taken together, section 17 and section 20 Children Act 1989, they essentially impose a duty upon a Local Authority to provide accommodation and support to any unaccompanied asylum-seeking child within their area (as in the case of LB). As a consequence, when the Defendant was presented with an unaccompanied asylum-seeking child it must conduct reasonable inquiries as to that child’s circumstances (which may include whether that the individual is a child).

In addition, with reference to the information on the referral form, the Local Authority’s initial assessment of the form and also taking into account that anxious and close scrutiny is required when dealing with such vulnerable children, we submitted that there was a failure on the part of the Local Authority to make sufficiently diligent further inquiries to establish whether LB was a child in need. We submitted that the Claimant on his own account was living in accommodation that was unsuitable to him, suffering from severe mental health difficulties and required assistance to access services due to his age and vulnerabilities. We contended that had sufficiently diligent further inquiries been undertaken in response to the referral such as asking questions about his living arrangements at the time, and whether they were appropriate or not, it would have been apparent to the Defendant Local Authority that he was a child ‘in need’, and consequently he would have been accommodated and supported, at which point, if they had done so, he would now automatically have achieved the requisite 13 weeks to be granted former relevant child status.

In support of our submissions, we instructed Dr Freedman to conduct a psychiatric assessment and instructed two independent social workers of the Independent Migrant Services to prepare an Independent Needs Assessment report. Both highlighted the unsuitability of the Claimant’s living circumstances and Dr Freedman noted that they likely exacerbated the Claimant’s Complex Post Traumatic Stress Disorder symptoms. With reference to both expert reports, we contended that it would have been apparent to the Defendant that the Claimant was a child ‘in need’ had sufficiently diligent further inquiries been undertaken. In addition, we referred to both expert’s assessments of the Claimant’s current needs as evidence of the consequences of the unlawfulness of the Defendant and argued that it follows that the sole justifiable outcome is that the Defendant is under a duty to exercise the discretionary power in the Claimant’s favour.

Defendant

The Defendant submitted that there is no free-standing duty to carry out an age assessment and that the question of whether a child is in need calls for an evaluative judgment, and that judgment must be based on reasonably enquiry, which they submitted they undertook in this case. The Defendant also referred to the form itself and information contained therein to support its position. In the alternative, the Defendant also relied on information from LB’s immigration solicitor as evidence that it is highly likely that the outcome for the Claimant would not have been substantially different if the failure to make reasonable inquiries had not occurred.

Conclusion

Karen Ridge, sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court, ruled in favour of the Claimant and took the exceptional step of directing that discretion should be exercised in his favour.

The Judge found that the Defendant failed to conduct reasonable inquiries following a safeguarding referral. In reaching this decision, and upon hearing submissions from both parties, the Judge concluded that ‘it would have been more likely than not that, had the Defendant made reasonable inquiries in response to the 26 March referral, the Claimant would have been deemed a child in need and further, on balance that the Claimant would have been accommodated. Had the Claimant been accommodated at the time, then he would subsequently have obtained the status of former relevant child’ (§67).

The Judge then examined whether the matter should be left to the Defendant or whether the ‘sole justifiable outcome’ was that the Defendant must be ordered to exercise its discretion in LB’s favour. She considered that the following weighed in favour of ordering the Defendant to exercise its discretion 1) the expert evidence which set out the Claimant’s current needs and outlined the consequences of the unlawfulness of the Defendant and 2) the fact that the Claimant had already been accommodated as a looked after child for a period of 10 weeks. Therefore, she concluded that ‘if a decision maker were directed to exercise its discretion, the outcome in this case would be obvious’ and ordered that the Defendant must exercise its discretion in LB’s favour (§71). This step was taken in recognition of the ‘significant unfairness’ of the Defendant’s decision to refuse to exercise its discretion and tends to be reserved only for cases where the unfairness is obvious and the remedy is so plain that there is only one way in which the decision maker could exercise their discretion (§71).

In practical terms, the consequence of the relief granted by the High Court is that LB will be entitled to significant support from the Local Authority under the leaving care rules. Such support includes but is not limited to a Personal Adviser and a Needs Assessment, which sets out what support LB will need and how this will be provided. In addition, LB will be entitled to assistance with education, training and/or with employment. The Local Authority also have a duty to provide assistance to the extent that LB welfare requires it, and this can include accommodation provisions and weekly financial support (which LB is now receiving from the Local Authority once again). Importantly, these duties continue until the age of 21, and in some cases, until the age of 25 years old.

Legal Representation

LB was represented by Rahul Kanani of Osbornes Law with Donnchadh Greene of Doughty Street Chambers instructed as Counsel.

With thanks to Alex McMahon of Osbornes Law who supervised Rahul Kanani.

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